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How Populists Wage 
Opposition: Parliamentary 
Opposition Behaviour and 
Populism in Netherlands
Tom Louwerse1 and Simon Otjes2
Abstract
This article analyses how populist parties wage opposition in parliament. We conceptualise 
opposition behaviour in terms of two independent dimensions: scrutiny (monitoring and 
criticising government actions) and policy-making (participating in or directly influencing legislative 
production). In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an opposition to the ruling elite in 
name of ‘the people’, our hypothesis is that populist opposition parties are more likely to use 
scrutiny and less likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist opposition parties. We study 
the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017 as a typical example of a consensus democracy, where 
populist parties have a greater opportunity to win representation and use parliamentary tools 
(compared to majoritarian democracies). Our findings indicate that populist opposition parties are 
particularly less likely to engage in policy-making behaviour and somewhat more likely to engage 
in scrutiny behaviour.
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Introduction
Political opposition is a vital characteristic of democracy, but the way in which opposition 
politics is organised varies greatly between countries (Dahl, 1966). In the last quarter 
century, populist parties have developed and thrived in Western democracies. A key ele-
ment of populism is their opposition to the ruling elite (Mudde, 2007). While populism 
has enjoyed great scholarly attention in the past decade, the relationship between pop-
ulism and parliamentary opposition behaviour has not been analysed in detail.1
Our aim is to study the relationship between populism and the choice for a particular 
type of parliamentary opposition behaviour. We develop a two-dimensional typology of 
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opposition party behaviour based on Mair’s (2009, 2011) distinction between responsible 
and responsive politics. On the one side, there are parties that take responsibility for gov-
ernment policy and cooperate with others to shape it. On the other side, there are parties 
that focus on representing the interests of voters but do so without taking responsibility. 
These parties tend to voice opposition against unpopular policies and will try to signal 
voters that they care for their concerns. On basis of this characterisation, we see opposi-
tion party behaviour as two-dimensional: first, there is a dimension that taps into the 
willingness of parties to engage in policy-making, reflecting Mair’s responsible approach 
to politics. The second dimension, scrutiny, taps into the extent to which parties voice 
opposition to policies and scrutinise decision-makers. We argue that this reflects Mair’s 
representative approach to politics. In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an 
opposition to the ruling elite in name of ‘the people’, we propose that populist parties are 
likely to engage in continuous and outspoken scrutiny of the government and are less 
likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist parties.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the Netherlands because it combines three elements: 
a consensus democracy, a left-wing populist party and a right-wing populist party. The 
Netherlands is unique in Western Europe because both left-wing and right-wing populist 
parties have been in parliament for more than a decade. This makes it an important case 
to study parliamentary behaviour of populist parties, as it allows us to examine their 
behaviour independent of their ideological orientation. As we will discuss in greater detail 
below, in consensus systems, populist parties have a greater chance to win significant and 
continued representation in parliament and to use parliamentary tools compared to major-
itarian systems. The open electoral system has allowed for the persistent presence of left-
wing and right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands: in 1994, the Socialist Party (the 
‘Against-party’), entered parliament in 1994. It was followed in 2002 by the ‘citizens’ 
revolt’ of the right-wing populist List Pim Fortuyn (De Vries and Van der Lubben, 2005). 
Since 2002, the lower House of the Dutch Parliament ‘has never been calm again’.2 
Studying opposition parties’ use of parliamentary instruments between 1998 and 2017 
offers substantial variation in the presence and size of populist parties. As a ‘typical’ case, 
we argue that our study of the Netherlands is informative of general patterns of opposition 
behaviour in many Western European parliaments, which have seen a similar rise of pop-
ulist parties and provide opposition parties with a wide range of parliamentary tools.
Below we will first outline our conceptualisation of opposition behaviour and discuss 
how it relates to populism. We then argue in greater detail why we select the Dutch case 
and what its relevance is in the broader literature. Our expectations are tested using a 
range of behavioural data from the Dutch lower house. As our findings show that populist 
parties indeed prefer a ‘critical opposition’ style that favours scrutiny over policy-making, 
we will discuss the comparative implications of our study in the conclusion.
Opposition Behaviour: Scrutiny and Policy-Making
Our study focuses on opposition party behaviour within the parliamentary arena and spe-
cifically the use of parliamentary tools. We analyse opposition activity in parliament 
using two independent dimensions: scrutiny and policy-making. As indicated above, 
these dimensions are derived from Mair’s (2011: 14) observation that in European party 
systems, there is a growing division ‘between parties which claim to represent, but don’t 
deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent’. Some opposition 
parties may use parliament primarily as an amplifier to express their opposition to the 
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governing majority. These parties focus on their ability to represent the voices of the vot-
ers in parliament (Mair 2011). Their behaviour would fit best in what is called a talking 
parliament (Polsby, 1975): expressing concerns and criticising those in power are much 
more important than deliberative contributions to policy making. Such parties will 
strongly voice their opposition to policies that are unpopular and will attempt to signal to 
voters that they care for their concerns. This is what Auel (2007: 500) calls political scru-
tiny: ‘assessment of and political judgement on the appropriateness of [government 
action]’. According to Mair (2011), this function of political parties has mainly been 
taken up by a new kind of opposition party that does not seek responsibility but focuses 
on responsiveness to voters’ demands. This means that these parties will scrutinise the 
government and will use the right of parliament to obtain information, to show that the 
government makes mistakes or ignores important societal problems. Moreover, they may 
voice their opposition by voting against legislation that the government produces.
Opposition parties can also focus on policy-making, using parliament as a market 
place for finding new majorities for their own policy initiatives. In this orientation, oppo-
sition parties behave in a way that fits the legislature as a working or transformative 
parliament (Polsby, 1975), in which political representatives with different policy agen-
das collectively try to formulate legislation. Despite their opposition status, these parties 
want to deliver policies and convince the governing majority (or parties within it) to 
change their proposed policies. To this end, opposition parties may use legislative initia-
tives, amendments and motions that call for some new and specific policy task to the 
government when adopted.
Scrutiny and policy-making can be used complementary to each other. Parties can ask 
questions to scrutinise government actions and propose amendments to change policies. 
Opposition parties also can refrain from one or both types of activity. This leads to a four-
fold typology of opposition activity visualised in Table 1. Constructive parties choose to 
focus on policy-making and leave the scrutiny activity to other parties. They seek to 
change new policies instead of highlighting government failure. They seek to deliver 
policies despite their opposition status and for that they need the support of (part of the) 
government coalition. Conversely, critical opposition parties choose to focus on scruti-
nising the government and leave policy-making to other parties. These parties do not seek 
a role of constructive opposition, but they just want to expose failures and limitations of 
the incumbents. While in most Westminster-style systems, this critical role is seen as the 
default stance for the opposition (as their policy making options are very limited), in 
consensus democracies like the Netherlands opposition parties are not necessarily 
restricted to being ‘critical’. Active opposition parties choose to both scrutinise the gov-
ernment and formulate alternative policies. These parties point out what is wrong and 
offer policy alternatives. The converse is a passive opposition, parties that are relatively 
uninterested in scrutiny and policy-making. As we will see later, mainly larger parties 





High Constructive opposition Active opposition
Low Passive opposition Critical opposition
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with previous government experience fall into this category: they will wait out their stint 
in opposition without much activity.
Populism and Opposition Behaviour
We expect that populist parties approach opposition differently from non-populist parties. 
Populism is conceptualised here with reference to two claims (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 
2008; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2004, 2007; Taggart, 2000). First, the actions 
of government should reflect the general will of the people. The people are considered by 
populist to be virtuous, pure and homogeneous (Taggart, 2000). Second, the current rul-
ing elite deprive the people of their right to rule. They no longer represent the people. 
Populists seek to ‘give back the government’ to the people (Taggart, 2000). Populism has 
a chameleonic quality (Taggart, 2000), which means that it can be combined with both 
left-wing and right-wing ideas.
While populism often is regarded as a binary characteristic that parties can either have 
or lack (Rooduijn, 2014), we think of populism in terms of degrees (Jagers and Walgrave, 
2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). Populism is not necessarily limited to new chal-
lenger parties; old parties might also partly adopt some level of populist rhetoric. 
Moreover, some parties might increase or weaken their populism over time.
Finally, some parties might be more outspoken in their populist stances than others. 
Because of their anti-elitism we expect populist parties to focus on scrutiny: bringing to 
light the failings of the incumbent government. We expect that they focus less on policy-
oriented activity: in the dichotomy of representing and delivering, these parties tend to 
focus on representation. After all, one of the central arguments of populism is that the 
existing elites fail to represent the people. They will generally focus on issues that estab-
lished parties (in their view) ignore. Policy-making is not expected to be a central concern 
for populists, as participating in a working relationship with other parties would only 
legitimise the current institutional framework and the existing parties. Populists resist the 
image of backroom dealing and compromising with the elite cartel and claim to express 
the ‘will of the people’ (Mudde, 2004). This leads us to the following hypotheses:
1. Populism-scrutiny hypothesis: The more populist an opposition party is, the more 
it will use scrutiny tools.
2. Populism-policy hypothesis: The more populist an opposition party is, the less it 
will use policy-making tools.
Case Selection
This article examines populist behaviour in parliament in a consensus democracy. 
Consensus democracies are characterised by a number of features, including open elec-
toral systems and relatively powerful parliaments compared to majoritarian democracies 
whose parliaments are dominated by their single party governments and which use closed 
electoral systems (Lijphart, 1999). These affect the ability of populist parties to wage 
opposition. The relatively open electoral systems allow populist parties to gain represen-
tation. In majoritarian countries that have seen populist parties play a significant electoral 
role, like France and the United Kingdom, the single member district electoral system 
prevents non-mainstream parties from winning a substantial representation: for instance, 
in the French 2017 legislative election, the Front National (National Front, FN) won 13% 
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of the votes and eight seats (out of 577) and in the 2015 UK parliamentary election, the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) won 13% of the vote and one seat (out of 
650). This was only the second time in its history that UKIP actually won a seat in the UK 
parliament (the previous seat was won in a 2014 by-election). Under proportional repre-
sentation, these parties would have won many more parliamentary seats.
Even when parties win parliamentary seats, the rights and position of opposition par-
ties differ from system to system. A key element of a consensus democracy is that in 
parliament, government parties are not, or at least not strongly, privileged. Both opposi-
tion and government parties have the same tools at their disposal, in terms of the ability 
to influence the agenda, make substantial proposals or use scrutiny tools. In many majori-
tarian systems, opposition parties do not have the same tools at their disposal as govern-
ment parties and their ability to determine the agenda or make substantial policy proposals 
is limited. The power of parliament to set its own agenda is strongly conceptually and 
empirically correlated with the level of consensus democracy in a country (Tsebelis, 
2002: 109–111). The power of the government over the legislature is so strong in France, 
for instance, that the government can decide on which bills amendments can and cannot 
be introduced (Döring, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002: 99). In the United Kingdom, the opportunity 
to discuss bills or motions introduced by the opposition is limited to opposition days and 
the largest opposition party (the official opposition party) gets the lion’s share of these 
days. In contrast, there is no relationship between consensus democracy and the opportu-
nity for the opposition to ask questions (Russo and Wiberg, 2010). It is not the case that 
in more independent parliaments, the right of MPs to information is stronger. Finally, 
electoral openness and parliamentary rules interact: for instance, in France, the parlia-
mentary rules privilege MPs that are a member of parliamentary party groups over MPs 
that are not. Since 1988, the FN contingent has always been too small to form a group.
Andeweg et al. (2008) argue that the relationship between consensus democracy and 
populist opposition goes even deeper: in their view, traditionally consensus democracies 
were characterised by the absence of real opposition (Andeweg et al., 2008; Daalder, 
1966). The institutions of consensus democracy were historically combined with a 
strongly segmented society, for instance, along religious lines. In these systems, opposi-
tion used to be absent: many consensus democracies have a tradition of multiparty coali-
tion governments, specifically oversized coalitions or Grand Coalitions between the 
largest parties of the left and the right (Lijphart, 1999: chapter 6). Even when segments of 
society are in opposition, they are likely to be involved in the broader policy making 
process: the parties could be in government at the subnational level (Lijphart, 1999: chap-
ter 10) or representatives of interest groups with close ties to opposition parties participate 
in corporatist decision-making (Lijphart, 1999: chapter 9). In many consensus democra-
cies, the strong societal cleavages waned at the mass level, but the consensual rules of the 
game at the elite-level remained (Andeweg, 2001; Lijphart, 1968). The continued tradi-
tion of cooperation and accommodation led to the cartelisation of politics. As elite coop-
eration was no longer necessary to overcome significant societal heterogeneity, it 
increasingly closed off the political arena, risking lower responsiveness to voters’ 
demands (Andeweg, 2001; Katz and Mair, 1995; but see Kitschelt, 2000). Therefore, as 
Andeweg (2001) suggests, these cartel democracies fostered the rise of populist parties 
that sought a power shift away from the elite and towards the people. This provides 
another explanation, in addition to the electoral system, why populist parties have better 
representation in consensus democracies compared to majoritarian democracies 
(Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007).
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We select the Netherlands because it is a consensus democracy that has both left-wing 
and right-wing populist parties in their parliament. There are five West European consen-
sus democracies: Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.3 Appendix 
A gives a complete overview of populist parties and democracy types in West Europe. Four 
out of five West European consensus democracies have both left-wing and right-wing 
populist parties in their parliament (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015): Austria has the Austrian 
Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) on the right and historically 
Alliance Future Austria (Bündis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ) and Team Stronach as well and 
the recent addition of the Pilz List (Liste Pilz) on the left (Eberl et al., 2017).4 Belgium has 
the Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, VB) on the right as well 
as the National Front (Front National, FN), which was inspired by but distinct from the 
French FN discussed above, and the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid/Parti du Travail 
de Belgique, PvdA/PTB) on the left. Germany has had The Left (Die Linke, DL) and the 
recent addition of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) in 2017 
on the right (Arzheimer, 2015). The Netherlands has had the Socialist Party (Socialistische 
Partij, SP) on the left since 1994 and a number of parties on the populist right: the Centre 
Party (Centrumpartij, CP), Centre Democrats (Centrum-Democraten, CD), List Pim 
Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF), Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and 
Forum voor Democratie (Forum voor Democratie, FvD) since 2017. Out of these only in 
the Netherlands have left- and right-wing populist parties been in parliament together for 
more than one parliamentary term. This case offers an important advantage: it allows one 
to examine how populists behave independent of their ideological orientation (Otjes and 
Louwerse, 2015); if one examines only left- or right-wing populist parties, it may be dif-
ficult to separate their populism from their policy position.
We argue that the Netherlands is a typical case of consensus democracy with a populist 
opposition. Populist parties can win parliamentary representation and have access to the 
full range parliamentary tools without strong restrictions on the use of parliamentary tools 
by the government or governing parliamentary majority. The choice of country affects the 
generalizability of the results. The results of our analysis certainly speak to other consen-
sus democracies. The extent to which results are likely to be relevant for majoritarian 
democracies depends on the institutional context and will be discussed in the 
conclusion.
Populism and Consensus Politics in the Netherlands
The Netherlands is a prototypical consensus democracy. Historically, its society was seg-
mented into different subcultures, named pillars, formed tightly knit-networks of parties 
and social organisations that encapsulated citizens from cradle to grave. It had many of 
the institutional features of a consensus democracy: a tendency for oversized coalition 
cabinets, allowing multiple parties to participate in government. Even opposition MPs 
could be influential in the Dutch ‘transformative parliament’ where expertise counts as 
much as political affiliation (Andeweg et al., 2008) and the minority has considerable 
influence over the parliamentary agenda (Döring, 1995). In the Dutch consensus systems, 
there traditionally was little place for an adversarial, Westminster-style opposition that 
opposes the government of the day and presents itself as an alternative administration. In 
parliament, opposition parties traditionally operate in a constructive way, offering not just 
criticism of the government, but also policy alternatives. The more adversarial oppositional 
voices were left to the smaller parties in the system (Daalder, 1966). They tended to represent 
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either smaller, more extreme versions of the established parties, such as communists and 
conservative Christians, or small one-day fly parties. Like in many other consensus 
democracies, between the 1960s and the 1980s, the segmented structure of Dutch society 
dissolved, but the elite ‘rules of the game’ stayed mostly in place (Van Praag, 1993). 
Society became more homogeneous, but the major parties that existed under the seg-
mented system formed the core of every government.
Since 1994 and 2017, populist opposition parties have consistently won representation 
in parliament. The year 1994 saw the election of the left-wing populist SP to the Second 
Chamber: a party that voiced a left-wing critique of the existing consensual political sys-
tem with clear elements of populism (Voerman, 2011). In 2002, the right-wing populist 
LPF was elected into parliament. With the LPF, the Netherlands now also had a perma-
nent and sizable right-wing populist critic of the consensual political system. The LPF 
was immediately invited to form a government with Christian-Democrats and the 
Liberals. After its short-lived adventure as a government party, it declined electorally. In 
2006, it was succeeded by the PVV as the parliamentary representative of radical right-
wing populism.
Research Design
We conduct an observational study of opposition party behaviour in the Netherlands 
between the 1998 and 2017 elections. While the time frame is constrained by data avail-
ability, this period goes back to 4 years before the 2002 ‘Fortuyn revolution’ and covers 
all completed parliamentary terms since then. Moreover, as we will see, the degree of 
populism has increased markedly over this time period, allowing us to study differences 
between populist and non-populist parties.
Dependent Variables
We operationalise scrutiny by constructing a scale based on the number of oral questions 
tabled by a party, the number of written questions and how often it voted against bills. 
Parliamentary questions are increasingly used. Between 1998 and 2017, 55,919 written 
questions were asked (20 per MP per year). Every week the Dutch parliament holds a 
televised Question Hour in which ministers and junior ministers can be asked questions. 
The Speaker of the House determines which questions can be asked on basis of questions 
submitted by MPs. There are no specific slots for specific parties; instead, the Speaker 
uses criteria like whether the issue has not been debated in parliament in the last weeks or 
will not be debated in upcoming weeks, whether it is the first proposal to debate the issue 
on that day and whether it concerns facts that have recently become known.5 About a fifth 
of the submitted questions can be asked during Question Hour. Between 1998 and 2017, 
2083 oral questions were asked, which is just below one question per MP per year. The 
final scrutiny tool parties have at their disposal are legislative votes. In the Netherlands, 
MPs very sparingly vote against bills (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009), most of which are 
government-initiated. Most bills are package deals including at least some measures that 
both coalition and opposition parties favour. Governmental budget bills are an example of 
this. Furthermore, laws often are technical in nature and involve small changes to existing 
policy. Voting against a bill is less an act to influence policy and more a sign of defiance 
of the norms of consensus government. No-votes also occur when a party strongly disa-
grees with the policy and uses negative voting as a means of expressing this.6
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Policy-making is measured as a combination of the number of legislative initiatives, 
amendments and motions proposed. Only a limited number of the laws proposed are 
MP-initiated. We have 179 legislative initiatives in our data, which indicates that every 
year, 9 out of 150 MPs write such a piece of legislation. Less than 2% of all bills are initi-
ated by MPs, all others are initiated by the government.7 Legislative initiatives do not 
necessarily result in changes in the law: out of the 179 laws proposed by MPs between 
1998 and 2017, 49% has not been put to a vote. Some bills that remain in legislative limbo 
are perhaps primarily meant as long press releases than as an actual change in policy. MPs 
are more active in proposing amendments: between 1998 and 2017, 8401 amendments 
were handed in (3 per MP per year). This is a way in which opposition MPs can influence 
policy: they examine a law proposed by the government and try to build a majority to alter 
it on a specific point. MPs can also propose motions; these are generally substantive in 
nature, just as ‘resolutions’ would be in other parliaments. Even when a parliamentary 
majority carries them, they are non-binding expressions of the opinion of parliament; they 
are meant to persuade the government to engage in policy-making activity. Motions are 
used frequently, which has led some scholars to question their power (Bakema, 1988). 
Between 1998 and 2017, 28,093 motions were handed in (10 per MP per year). Still, a 
motion that is adopted, can have some policy impact: ministers are expected to address 
these motions, for example, by initiating the proposed policy under their own responsibil-
ity and have it implemented. Many government bills explicitly mention motions as one of 
the reasons for the bill.
We have collected the motions, written questions and amendments by using purpose 
written scripts on the digital archives of the Dutch parliament (Louwerse et al., 2018). We 
have also collected parliamentary votes automatically with purpose-written scripts that 
examine the parliamentary minutes to identify when a vote is held. We have collected all 
votes (on bills, amendments and motions) but limited our analysis here to votes on bills. 
The data for oral questions have been obtained from Timmermans and Breeman (2010) 
for the period until 2010, and the digital archives of the Tweede Kamer for the period 
2010–2017 and data on legislative initiatives was obtained from the Eerste Kamer.
In order to examine these data in a comparable way, we look at the number of motions, 
amendments, oral and written questions per MP per year. This means that the number of 
motions is calculated for each party for each parliamentary period and then divided by the 
number of MPs each party had times the number of years that that parliamentary period 
lasted. This means that we have a measure that we can compare better across time (longer 
and shorter parliamentary periods) and across larger and smaller parliamentary parties. 
We look at all sponsors of motions, amendments and bills, so a party is regarded as a 
sponsor even when it was only the fifth to sign. We disregard parliamentary parties that 
were formed during the parliamentary term.8
We create two scales of parliamentary behaviour: scrutiny and policy-making. We first 
normalise all of the indicators discussed above so that all the minima are 0 and all their 
maxima are 1. As a result, each indicator contributes equally to the scale. The scale is 
calculated by summing the three indicators and rescaling the indices to run between a 
theoretical minimum of 0 to a maximum of 10. The items for each scale are positively 
correlated (Cronbach’s alpha = .63 and .60 respectively).9 We also create a ‘Scrutiny vs 
Policy-Making’ variable calculated as scrutiny minus policy-making. This captures 
whether parties prioritise one over another. Parties that use scrutiny extensively and 
exclusively will receive scores well above zero; parties that use policy-making more 
often than scrutiny will score below zero.
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Independent Variable
Populism is operationalised by means of an automated measure of content analysis devel-
oped by Pauwels (2011). This technique measures populism by the use of list of 24 words 
that measure anti-elitism. We applied this measure on all Dutch party manifestos pub-
lished between 1998 and 2012. We look at the number of anti-elitist words per a thousand, 
which in our dataset ranges from 0 to 6.10
Control Variables
Our analysis takes into account a number of control variables. First, we control for the 
policy distance between the opposition party and the government parties.11 If an opposition 
party has a policy position that is hugely different from the government’s, it is more likely 
that they will engage in active opposition, either scrutiny or policy-making. As populist par-
ties are usually more outspoken in terms of policy, we need to control for this. Using Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey policy position estimates on the left-right scale (Bakker et al., 2015), we 
calculate policy distance as the absolute difference between the position of the government 
and the position of each opposition party. We measure the government position by calculat-
ing the mean position of its constituent parties, weighted by coalition seat share.12
We need to control for party size for two reasons. First, our measures of opposition behav-
iour are normalised by MP, but it is not entirely reasonable to expect that a party with 30 MPs 
produces 30 times more parliamentary output than a party with a single MP. This is particu-
larly true for amendments and motions, which a party typically signs only once – and there 
is a limit to the number of detailed proposals a party can put forward. Moreover, the size of a 
party may inform its expectations about the future. Larger parties may have the reasonable 
expectation to enter government, after the elections, if the existing government loses its 
majority. As the Dutch cabinet formation is characterised by partial alternation (Mair, 1997), 
opposition parties might very well have to work together in the future with current govern-
ment parties. Therefore, larger parties may choose to tone down populist rhetoric, limit their 
policy-making activity and refrain from parliamentary scrutiny. We measure size as the log 
of the number of MPs a party had at the beginning of the parliamentary term.13
The argument made for size above, also applies for a history of government participa-
tion. A key predictor of whether a party expects to be in government is whether it has been 
in government previously. Similarly, parties that have been in government before can be 
expected to take a less populist stance as well as to display more passive parliamentary 
behaviour. We use government history: the percentage of days a party has governed out 
of the total number of years, it has existed before the beginning of the term. This differs 
between 0 (for parties that have always been in opposition) and 1 (for the LPF which in 
the 2003–2006 term had only been a government party while in parliament). Here, we 
disregard the government history of parties that have merged.
Finally, we control for the trend of increased use of parliamentary instruments over 
time, motions and questions in particular. While ideally we would control for the factors 
underlying this trend, a lack of available data drives us to using a time proxy. The trend 
variable indicates the time between the beginning of the 1998–2002 term and the median 
day in the term of interest (in years).
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our variables. Given the fact that our variables 
are measured at the interval level and show no large deviations from normality, which is 
important due to the small sample size, we employ ordinary least squares regression. As 
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our data have an unbalanced panel structure (largely the same parties in different parlia-
mentary periods over time), we use clustered standard errors (per party).
Patterns of Opposition Behaviour in the Netherlands
Figure 1 shows opposition party scores on our two dimensions: scrutiny and policy activ-
ity. We can distinguish between four clusters of parties: first, there is the passive opposi-
tion, parties showing relatively low levels of activity on either dimension. The Liberal 
Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), the Labour Party (Partij van de 
Arbeid, PvdA) and the Christian-Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, 
CDA), the large parties with a history of government participation, tend to be found in 
this category. They do not scrutinise the government excessively nor do they offer many 
policy alternatives. As we shall see below, part of this effect may be explained by their 
size. The LPF that was present in our data only in one term, also is in this category.
Second, the constructive opposition, which focuses on policy activity instead of scru-
tiny activity. These parties propose motions, amendments and initiatives but do not ask 
many questions nor do they often vote against bills. The conservative Christian parties 
Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) and ChristianUnion 
(ChristenUnie, CU) can mainly be found in this category. These parties are known for 
their ‘governmental’ orientation. This means that despite not being part of the governing 
coalition, they approach it with goodwill. For the CU especially we can see a general 
increase in activity on both dimensions: this means that it has moved through the con-
structive opposition category, starting as a more passive opposition party and ending up 
as more active opposition party.
Third, there is a group of parties that makes frequent use of all of the available tools. 
These parties are the active opposition. These are GreenLeft (GroenLinks, GL), Democrats 
66 (Democraten 66, D66), the pensioners’ party 50PLUS and the Party for the Animals 
(Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD). The two-woman PvdD parliamentary party is known for 
its exceptional activity in both offering policy alternatives and scrutinising the govern-
ment, almost exclusively in the domain of animal welfare (Otjes, 2014).
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max
Policy-making 42 3.38 1.98 0.46 3.10 7.97
 Initiatives 42 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.52
 Motions 42 48.38 30.01 7.17 43.83 127.97
 Amendments 42 8.69 5.85 0.00 7.98 22.02
Scrutiny 42 3.41 1.73 0.00 3.36 7.27
 Written questions 42 29.10 21.2 3.18 26.15 113.60
 Oral questions 42 1.46 0.91 0.00 1.44 3.53
 Voting for bills 42 0.86 0.09 0.64 0.88 1.00
Scrutiny vs policy-making 42 0.02 2.18 −4.29 −0.12 4.08
Populism 42 0.66 0.86 0.04 0.44 4.61
Party size 42 9.92 9.36 1.36 7.04 42.00
L-R distance to government 42 2.45 1.47 0.10 2.40 5.58
Government history 42 0.18 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00
Trend 42 9.29 4.60 1.98 10.37 14.82
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In the final quadrant, we find the critical opposition, which excels in asking questions 
and voting against government bills. The SP and the PVV mainly fall into this category: 
one should note here that the populism of the SP has waxed and waned over time, as is 
evident from the scale we use. Interestingly, in the periods that the party was most popu-
list in its election manifesto (1998 and 2010), it also was more extreme in its use of scru-
tiny tools compared to the periods when it was less populist in its election manifesto. The 
PVV is also located mostly in the critical quadrant. An exception is in 2010, when a 
minority government was formed with support of the PVV, the party moved into the pas-
sive opposition mode, which is to be expected for a party that falls between the ‘govern-
ment’ and ‘opposition’ categories. Still, it was about as high on our scrutiny dimensions 
as the opposition parties SGP and PvdA in that same period. After a majority cabinet was 
formed in 2012, the PVV has shown its oppositional side once more. Liveable Nederland 
Figure 1. Scrutiny and Policy-Making Among Dutch Opposition Parties (1998–2017)
Dotted lines indicate the mean score on each index.
Party abbreviations (English party names): 50Plus: 50PLUS; CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; CU: 
ChristianUnion; D66: Democrats 66; GL: GreenLeft; LN: Liveable Netherlands; LPF: List Pim Fortuyn; PvdA: 
Labour Party; PvdD: Party for the Animals; PVV: Freedom Party; SP: Socialist Party; SGP: Political Reformed 
Party; VVD: Liberal Party.
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(Leefbaar Nederland, LN), a minor centrist populist party in parliament between 2002 
and 2003 also falls in this category.
The Effect of Populism on Opposition Party Behaviour
To determine the relationship between populism and the type of opposition party behav-
iour, we assess our two dimensions separately (see Table 3). We find a strong and signifi-
cant effect of populism on opposition party policy-making activity (p < 0.001). For a unit 
increase on the populism measure, our model predicts a 0.66 decrease on the 10-point 
policy-making scale. This means that the predicted value for the most populist party (4.6) 
in our dataset is 3 points lower than for the least populist party (0.04). Given that the scale 
theoretically ranges from 0 to 10, this is a substantively large effect. In line with our 
expectations, we find that populist parties do use policy-making instruments less often 
than other parties. We also find a significant effect for one of our control variables, size, 
indicating that larger parties use policy-making instruments less. This may be explained 
by two mechanisms: we employ a pro capita measure of policy-making. It is, however, 
unlikely that there is a linear relationship between the number of MPs and the activity of 
a parliamentary party, because there is only a limited number of issues on the agenda a 
party can make proposals on. As parties grow bigger, they may become more active in 
absolute terms, but not in relative terms, with average activity per MP dropping. Moreover, 
parties may have the reasonable expectation of taking up government office in the future 
and therefore not needing to realise policy goals while in opposition. Opposition then 
may be an intermezzo to being a member of government for large opposition parties. 
Waiting for the next chance for incumbency takes away the sense of urgency to realise 
policy goals when in opposition. Our government history control variable is not signifi-
cant. This indicates that the effect of party size is likely mainly to be due to our pro capita 
Table 3. Regression Models of Opposition Activity.
Scrutiny Policy-making Scrutiny vs policy-making
Intercept 1.16 3.27*** −2.10*
 (1.07) (0.47) (0.92)
Populism 0.33* −0.66** 0.98***
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.25)
Party size (log) −0.57 −0.73* 0.16
 (0.40) (0.35) (0.46)
Government history 0.28 −0.29 0.57
 (0.94) (0.97) (0.96)
L-R distance to government 0.65** −0.10 0.75**
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.25)
Trend 0.16*** 0.24*** −0.08
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
R2 0.54 0.54 0.50
Adj. R2 0.47 0.48 0.43
Num. obs. 42 42 42
Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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measure of policy-making, rather than the expectation of future government participa-
tion, as this would also apply to the actual history of government participation.
When we look at scrutiny, we find that the coefficient runs in the hypothesised direc-
tion and significant, but is substantially smaller than for policy-making (b = 0.33).14 This 
amounts to a difference of 1.5 points on our scrutiny scale between the most and least 
populist party, if we keep all other variables constant. Upon closer inspection of the data, 
we find that while populist parties (PVV, 50PLUS, LN, SP) generally show higher scru-
tiny values, a number of non-populist parties show similarly high levels of scrutiny (PvdD 
and GL). These are parties that like the populists generally are quite distant from the 
government in terms of policy. This is confirmed by the coefficient for Left-Right 
Distance to the Government achieving significance (p < 0.001): the coefficient of 0.65 
implies that the parties that are most distant from the government in terms of policy (5.6) 
score about 3.5 points higher on scrutiny, according to our model. All in all, policy differ-
ences play a more important role than populism in itself in explaining how active opposi-
tion parties are in terms of scrutiny.
In our third model, we look at the trade-off between scrutiny and policy-making. 
This captures the extent to which parties prioritise scrutiny over policy-making, which 
should help us to better distinguish critical opposition parties from active opposition 
parties on the scrutiny dimension and from passive opposition parties on the policy-
making dimension. The variable ‘Scrutiny vs Policy-Making’ captures whether parties 
prioritise scrutiny over policy-making. Here, we find a strong and significant effect of 
populism (b = 0.98, p < 0.001). Populist parties focus on scrutiny more than on policy-
making, in line with our expectations. This effect is substantively meaningful: about 4.5 
points on a scale that effectively runs from −4.3 (most policy-making oriented) to 4.1 
(most scrutiny oriented).
In summary, we find support for our expectation that populist parties behave differ-
ently in parliament from non-populist parties. The effect is most visible for policy-mak-
ing activities, which populist parties employ less often compared to the other opposition 
parties. We find a smaller effect for scrutiny activities: populist parties use these some-
what more often than non-populists. When we look at the priorities set by parties, populist 
parties are clearly oriented more towards scrutiny, and less towards policy contributions. 
Thus, populism is an important predictor of the type of opposition behaviour.
Conclusion
This article analysed how populist parties actually behave as opposition parties. We stud-
ied opposition party behaviour distinguishing two dimensions: scrutiny and policy-mak-
ing. As hypothesised, we found that populist parties use policy-making tools less often 
and scrutiny tools more, although the effect of populism on policy-making is clearly 
stronger. This means that populist parties pair the anti-elite rhetoric with their own reper-
toire of opposition activity, which we qualify as ‘critical’ opposition. The rise of populist 
parties came with the rise of this more confrontational kind of opposition, characterised 
by scrutiny rather than policy-making.
In the theory section, we proposed a mirrored effect of populism on scrutiny and pol-
icy-making: populist parties exemplify a kind of representative politics, which favours 
critiquing the government over taking responsibility for making government policy. We 
expected that populist parties use more scrutiny tools and make less use of policy-making 
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tools. If there would be a difference, given that populist parties are characterised by anti-
elitism, one would expect them to excel in scrutiny. We find, however, that the effect of 
populism on scrutiny is weaker than the effect of populism on policy-making. Thus, pop-
ulists are not exceptionally more likely to be critical of the government compared to other 
opposition parties, in particular small green and social-liberal parties that also ask written 
and oral questions to focus public attention on mistakes the government made or articu-
late public concerns. They do differ in their willingness to work hard to propose detailed 
policy compromises that other parties may agree to. This is reasonable given their antago-
nism to compromises of the elite cartel. It does, however, have implications to the way we 
think about populists in parliament. In his respect, they do differ significantly from other 
opposition parties in particular the smaller green, social-liberal and Christian parties.
These smaller, non-populist opposition parties follow a tradition of consensus politics: 
parliament is a working legislature where MPs try to build coalitions for new policies. 
Our findings show that these smaller opposition parties are more inclined to present pol-
icy alternatives in parliament, through the use of initiatives, amendments and motions. 
Particularly interesting from the perspective of consensus democracy are the small 
Christian parties SGP and the CU, which focus more on policy-making than scrutiny 
tools, as they follow a constructive opposition strategy. These parties used to be more 
oppositional in their orientation, as they have their roots in the permanent small opposi-
tion parties. All in all, the cartelised democracy in the Netherlands, with its relatively 
homogeneous population, a declined meaning of old societal cleavages and continued 
elite cooperation has sparked a differentiation of types of parliamentary opposition. We 
have observed critical opposition focusing on scrutiny activity by populist parties, coop-
erative opposition by small, centrist opposition parties, and a relatively passive opposi-
tion by the largest parties, particularly in policy-making activity.
The Netherlands was picked as a representative case of a consensus democracy. These 
systems give populist parties the opportunity to win seats in parliament and the parliamen-
tary tools to actually wage opposition. The extent to which this two-dimensional approach 
can be applied to other parliaments, depends on whether not using certain tools is a sign of 
choice of the party’s MP and not just the parliament’s rules that limits MPs use of parlia-
mentary tools. The patterns we see here may be translated to other consensus democracies 
with populist parties such as Austria, Belgium and Germany. In the combination of popu-
list opposition from the left and right in parliament this case may be particularly interesting 
for those interested in how parliamentary politics may develop in the Bundestag after the 
entry of Alternative für Deutschland. Where it comes to more majoritarian parliaments, 
patterns may be different. For one, populist parties are less likely to win representation 
here or to win sufficient representation to form a parliamentary party group and to be able 
to use all parliamentary tools. Second, in those systems, opposition parties are constrained 
in their ability to propose alternative policies. While populist opposition parties may have 
the same preferences for tools in both consensus and majoritarian democracies, the ability 
of parties to actually use them strongly depends on the parliamentary rules. If all opposi-
tion parties are restricted in their ability to initiate legislation, propose amendments and 
formulate motions, the differences between populist and non-populist opposition parties in 
their use of these tools may be smaller, simply because of these institutional constraints. As 
a result, one might expect that in majoritarian democracies non-populist parties are more 
likely to be similar to populist parties in not proposing that many alternative policies. In 
terms of the opportunity to use scrutiny tools there is no difference between consensus and 
majoritarian democracies, and therefore, we expect the populist preference for these to be 
visible in majoritarian democracies as well. All in all, we might expect that in majoritarian 
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democracies, many opposition parties can be characterised as ‘critical opposition’, not 
only populist opposition parties. Further research is warranted to determine to what extent 
the typology of opposition party behaviour developed here can be extended to other types 
of democracies, including parliaments in more majoritarian systems and to what extent the 
relationship between populism and opposition party behaviour found here, holds there.
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Notes
 1. To our knowledge, the literature on the parliamentary behaviour of populist parties is very limited. While 
Andeweg et al. (2008) and Andeweg (2013) outline a research agenda, there is the study of the behaviour of 
the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP) during its short period as an opposition party 
by Church and Vatter (2009), studies of the discourse of populist parties when they are in government and 
in opposition (such as Bobba and Mcdonnell, 2016) and a study of the parliamentary voting behaviour of 
left and right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015).
 2. The quote is from Mariëtte Hamer, at the time one of the longest sitting Dutch MPs. Cited in: Besselink N 
and K Zandbergen (2014) ‘Sinds Fortuyn is het hectisch’, Trouw, July 5, 2014.
 3. So called unitary democracies are similar to consensus democracies on what Lijphart (1999) calls the 
parties-executives dimension. They also have open electoral systems and a relatively independent parlia-
ment. Only one of these had both left and right-wing populist parties (Denmark but only for 1 year). This 
would not change the case selection
 4. Die Presse (10 October 2017) ‘Peter Pilz im Chat: “Populist? Wahrscheinlich bin ich einer”’ https://diepresse.com/
home/innenpolitik/nationalratswahl/5292924/Peter-Pilz-im-Chat_Populist-Wahrscheinlich-bin-ich-einer
 5. Letter of the Speaker to Members of the House (29 February 2016)
 6. If we exclude this indicator from our Scrutiny Index, the findings of this paper are largely similar, but the 
effect of populism is less statistically significant, p = 0.07 compared to p = 0.03 in the main model (see 
Appendix A).
 7. We have this data for the period between 6 May 1998 until 1 January 2015 when 64 private members were 
voted upon out a total of 4116.
 8. We merge the data for the RPF, GPV and ChristianUnion (CU) for the 1998–2002 term.
 9. The correlation is weaker between Initiatives and Amendments (r = 0.11); we still include Initiatives as it 
is conceptually linked with the other two and the correlation with Motions is at least moderate (r = 0.31). 
Our results are not substantially affected when we exclude initiatives from the policy-making scale (see 
Appendix A).
10. There are number of special cases: the RPF and GPV merged over the course of the 1998–2002 term. We 
treat the RPF and GPV manifestos as though it was one manifesto. In 2003, many parties published short 
manifestos adding to the 2002 manifesto. For the 2003–2006 term, we take the 2002 and 2003 manifestos 
together.
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11. We performed robustness checks employing policy extremism as an alternative variable, which simply meas-
ures a parties’ distance to the centre of the left-right scale. Our findings regarding the impact of populism were 
not significantly affected. Because of collinearity concerns, we leave this variable out of the main analysis.
12. Six parties posed some difficulty: the CU in 1998–2002 term, the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 
(SGP) and Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD) in the 2006–2010 parliament, the PVV in 2003–2006 parliament, 
and Leefbaar Nederland (LN) in the 2002–2003 parliament because there are no measures in the CHES 
data set. For the CU, we calculate the average of the two parties that merged into it (RPF and GPV). We 
assign the SGP, the PvdD and the PVV the values from the subsequent CHES analysis. For LN, this option 
is not available. Given LN’s centrist position we assign it the value 5.
13. A scatter plot of size and the number of motions, initiatives, amendments, and written questions (per MP), 
respectively, indicates that these relationships are non-linear. Only for oral questions, we observe a linear 
relationship with party size. Therefore, we use the log of the number of seats held by the party. This does 
not affect our main findings.
14. We are particularly careful to not overemphasise this result: if we delete ‘voting against the government’ 
from the scrutiny dimension the effect of populism is somewhat smaller and no longer statistically sig-
nificant (see Appendix A). The relationship seems particularly weak for Oral Questions, which might be 
related to the fact that access to the floor to ask oral questions is controlled by the Speaker, limiting parties’ 
opportunities to use this tool.
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